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"We must not allow this piece of our past to become pro-
logue.... We will lose . .. without a shot being fired if we sacri-
fice the liberties of the American people in the belief that by
doing so we will stop the terrorists."'
- Senator Russell Feingold, October 2001
I. INTRODUCTION
E COLI, SMART, Red Cross, Exercise, Port, San Diego, Ice,*Swine, DHS, Erosion, Help, Crest, Aid, Burst, Relief,
Worm, 2600, Lightening, Sleet, Enriched, Tremor, Organiza-
tion, Tamiflu, Recall, Pork, UN, Agent, Facility, Gas.2 If the com-
bination of the words you just read confused you, you are not
alone. The words' source is a substantially larger list of terms
deemed "Key Words & Search Terms" that a Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) media analyst is tasked with identify-
ing from social media websites.3 The use of too many key words
could land an individual on a suspicion list that could prevent
him from flying commercially.4
In what has been artfully expressed as "The Bin Laden Excep-
tion,"' post-September 11, 2001 (9/11) fear of terrorism has
driven most American citizens to overlook governmental intru-
sions on their constitutional rights-particularly Fourth Amend-
ment and Privacy Act6 rights-in exchange for what they assume
means a safer nation.' Nowhere is this "Exception" more preva-
I Protecting Constitutional Freedoms in the Face of Terrorism: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on the Constitution, Federalism, and Prop. Rights of the S. Comm. on the judiciary,
107th Cong. 1 (2001) (statement of Sen. Russell Feingold, Chairman, S. Sub-
comm. on the Constitution, Federalism, and Prop. Rights).
2 DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NAT'L OPERATIONS CTR. MEDIA MONITORING CAPA-
BILITY DESKTOP REFERENCE BINDER 20-24 (2011), available at http://epic.org/
foia/epic-v-dhs-media-monitoring/Analyst-Desktop-Binder-REDACTED.pdf.
3 Id.
4 See Kevin Bankston & Megan E. Gray, Government Surveillance and Data Privacy
Issues: Foundations and Developments, 3 No. 8 PRIVACY & INFO. L. REP. 1 (2003).
5 Erik Luna, The Bin Laden Exception, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 230, 247
(2012).
6 Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at
44 U.S.C. § 552A).
7 Luna, supra note 5, at 238-42.
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lent than in commercial air travel, which provides transporta-
tion to approximately 640 million passengers each year.8 Due to
the terrorist attacks on 9/11, Congress passed the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act,' which created the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) to protect passenger safety
through various screening measures.'o Civil rights groups usu-
ally challenge such measures as violations of privacy," and as a
result, the TSA has become synonymous with negative depic-
tions of "Big Brother" watching over travelers. Others argue that
the TSA is largely successful in keeping travelers safe and that
with such security comes some justifiable loss of civil liberty.12
Most recently, the TSA implemented PreCheck, a passenger
screening program that offers expedited screening to frequent
fliers who volunteer personal information so that the TSA can
conduct an extensive background check to prescreen the pas-
sengers." PreCheck seems to be an ideal solution to today's do-
mestic travel inconveniences. At least that is how the TSA is
marketing the program: if a traveler is willing to give up some
information about herself, she will be able to enjoy a security
experience that no longer consists of removing certain articles
of clothing or unpacking liquids and laptops.14 Some people
may agree with this program's goals, believing or perhaps ac-
cepting that we live in a world where informational privacy is
limited, if not nonexistent. Yet others hold on to and fight for
the "right to be let alone"'5 and the right to be free from govern-
ment knowledge of their every move or mouse click.'" To these
8 Your Safety Is Our Priority, About TSA, TSA, http://www.tsa.gov/about-tsa/
your-safety-our-priority (last visited June 4, 2013).
9 Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 49 U.S.C.).
10 See 6 U.S.C. § 202(1) (2012); 49 U.S.C. § 114(d) (2006).
11 See, e.g., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1
(D.C. Cir. 2011).
12 See Deborah von Rochow-Leuschner, CAPPS II and the Fourth Amendment: Does
It Fly?, 69 J. AIR L. & COM. 139, 149-51 (2004).
13 See TSA Pre/Tm Expedited Screening, TSA, http://www.tsa.gov/tsa-precheck/
tsa-precheck-expedited-screening (last visited Oct. 28, 2013).
14 TSA Pre/m How It Works, TSA, http://www.tsa.gov/tsa-precheck/tsa-
precheck-how-it-works (last visited Oct. 28, 2013).
15 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
16 Groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and Electronic
Privacy Information Center (EPIC) have been particularly vocal against passen-
ger prescreening programs. See Heather Mac Donald, Perils of Privacy, N.Y. POST
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individuals, a closer look at the TSA's PreCheck program reveals
its role as an initial step toward such invasions.' 7 Privacy advo-
cates have succeeded in halting similar programs before,' 8 but
this time, with the overwhelming popularity of the "voluntary"
risk-based intelligence approach, travelers will likely not even re-
alize that PreCheck is simply a newer, shinier version of the old
programs.
This comment begins with a brief description of passenger
prescreening or "profiling" programs that the U.S. government
has either successfully implemented or merely attempted to im-
plement since 9/11. Each program was met with resistance, and
Part II attempts to illustrate the successes and failures of each
system in light of the legal and political climate in which it was
introduced. Next, Part III discusses the primary legal avenues
under which aviation security measures have been challenged:
the Fourth Amendment and the Privacy Act. That Part reflects
upon how the current judicial standards, as expressed in recent
case law, are extraordinarily deferential to the government and
its policies furthering aviation security. Part IV then describes
the current international shift toward a risk-based security
model, Checkpoint of the Future, and the TSA's newest pro-
gram, PreCheck. Lastly, Part V reconciles PreCheck with the
Fourth Amendment and the Privacy Act through the lens of the
past screening programs and their accompanying successes and
failures. The comment concludes that the PreCheck program,
due to its appeal to convenience and choice, will finally give the
TSA the necessary amount of public approval to move forward
with risk-based intelligence, or "profiling."
II. BRIEF HISTORY OF PASSENGER PROFILING SYSTEMS
In the past twenty years, the U.S. government has attempted
to strengthen aviation security with several passenger profiling
systems. Each program encountered resistance from multiple
organizations, the loudest of which were the American Civil Lib-
erties' Union (ACLU) and the Electronic Privacy Information
Center (EPIC)." Despite this resistance, the programs and their
(Apr. 26, 2004), http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/-nypost-perils of
privacy.htm.
17 Jay Stanley, TSA Once Again Considering Using Commercial Data to Profile Passen-
gers, ACLU (Jan. 11, 2013), http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technol-
ogy-and-liberty/tsa-once-again-considering-using-commercial-data.
is See infra Part II (discussing CAPPS II and other similar programs).
19 See Mac Donald, supra note 16.
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evolution illustrate the importance of striking a balance between
security and liberty, particularly considering the rapid advance-
ment of technology and intelligence.o Public memory is often
short, and citizens frequently become desensitized to govern-
ment privacy invasions, particularly ones that are deemed neces-
sary for national security.2' Hopefully the perspectives gained
from past programs can more accurately frame the PreCheck
program and the potential issues that will arise during its
development.
A. AUTOMATED TARGETING SYSTEM-CBP
The Automated Targeting System (ATS) is an intelligence-
based screening program that U.S. Customs and Border Protec-
tion (CBP) employs to evaluate the risk of passengers traveling
through the country.22 A grossly oversimplified explanation of
the program is that the ATS attaches a risk score to each trav-
eler, which remains on file with CBP for forty years.23 The risk
score is calculated by compiling a vast array of data, including:
passenger travel information provided by airlines; information
regarding trips across the U.S. border; automated commercial
data; Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) 24
data; and law enforcement data.
Rampant criticism of the ATS amongst privacy groups focused
largely on the means by which the public learned of the pro-
gram's application to passengers. 6 While the ATS was in place
to scan individuals, their luggage, and carry-ons for at least four
years, the public did not find out about the program until
2006, when the DHS published an explanation in the Federal
20 See von Rochow-Leuschner, supra note 12, at 149.
21 Luna, supra note 5, at 238-47.
22 Ellen Nakashima, Air Passenger Data Program Concerns European Officials,
WASH. POST (Dec. 14, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2006/12/13/AR2006121301982.html.
23 Michael J. Sniffen, Feds Rate Travelers for Terrorism, WASH. POST (Nov. 30,
2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/30/
AR2006113000988.html.
24 TECS is an information database that identifies individuals suspected of fed-
eral law violations. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR
CBP PROCEDURES FOR PROCESSING TRAVEL DOCUMENTS AT THE BORDER 4 (July 2,
2008).
25 Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records, 71 Fed. Reg. 64,543, 64,545 (Nov. 2,
2006).
26 Sniffen, supra note 23.
27 Some suggest that the use of the ATS for passenger screening actually dates
back to 1999. EPIC, COMMENTS OF THE ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER
6212013]
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Register.2 1 In an attempt to appease privacy advocates, the DHS
filed a subsequent Notice of Privacy of System Records29 and a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,so which sought to exempt cer-
tain information from the Privacy Act. EPIC filed a comment
during the rulemaking process, citing several reasons why the
program violates privacy, including the argument that it violates
a constitutional right to travel.31 This effort to calm critics, how-
ever, was ultimately futile.
While privacy concerns remain, the ATS is here to stay. 2 The
DHS recently issued a Privacy Impact Assessment in which it reit-
erated its statutory authority to gather such information.3 3 Spe-
cifically, the Assessment cited 49 U.S.C. § 44909," the Enhanced
Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002," along with
many other authorities." The immensely broad constitutional
power of the government to protect the U.S. borders provides
perhaps the strongest argument for CBP's authority to conduct
such extensive screenings."
To DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY ON DOCKET Nos. DHS-2007-0042 AND
DHS-2007-0043 (Sept. 5, 2007) [hereinafter EPIC COMMENTS].
28 Sniffen, supra note 23.
29 Privacy Act of 1974; U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Automated
Targeting System, System of Records, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,650, 43,650-51, 43,653
(Aug. 6, 2007).
30 Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Automated Targeting
System, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,567, 43,567-68 (Aug. 6, 2007).
3] EPIC COMMENTS, supra note 27.
32 DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE AUTOMATED
TARGETING SYSTEM (June 1, 2012) [hereinafter PRIVACY IMPACT AsSESSMENT].
3 Id.
3 49 U.S.C. § 44909(a) (2006) ("Air carrier requirements- . . . the Secretary
of Transportation shall require each air carrier to provide a passenger manifest
for a flight to an appropriate representative of the Secretary of State . . . . The
passenger manifest should include the following information: (A) the full name
of each passenger[;] (B) the passport number of each passenger, if required for
travel[; and] (C) the name and telephone number of a contact for each
passenger.").
3 Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-173, 116 Stat. 543 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
6 See PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 32, at 9.
3 Seth M.M. Stodder, Finding Terrorist Needles: The Automated Targeting System, 9
ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SoC'v PRAC. GRPS. 84, 88 (2008) (quoting United States v.
Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004) ("[T]he Government's interest in
preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the inter-
national border.") (internal quotation marks omitted) and Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925) ("[T]ravelers may be so stopped in crossing an
international boundary because of national self-protection reasonably requiring
one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his be-
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B. CAPS
Motivated largely by the perceived success of the ATS, 8 Presi-
dent Clinton's Administration launched the original Computer
Assisted Passenger Screening (CAPS) System to assess the risk of
domestic travelers.3 ' The goal of CAPS was to shift security's fo-
cus away from "low-risk" fliers and toward "high-risk passengers"
with suspicious characteristics.40 Marking a drastic switch to in-
telligence-based airport security procedures, CAPS allowed com-
puters to assess passengers' airline travel information and other
undisclosed criteria that the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) refused to identify."' The program did not extend far
enough to include government data or law enforcement infor-
mation. 2 Although there was some evidence that the program
used ethnicity in its assessment,4 3 the Department of Justice de-
clared that the program was not discriminatory toward
passengers.4 4
This risk assessment dictates which passengers are subject to
higher standards of screening." Shortly after implementation,
CAPS was scaled back to screen only checked baggage as op-
posed to passengers and carry-on luggage, due in large part to
the public's negative reaction.4 6 The effects of this limitation be-
came strikingly apparent when the terrorist attacks of 9/11 oc-
curred at the hands of nineteen individuals, nine of whom were
identified by CAPS as high-risk but were not stopped because
longs as effects which may be lawfully brought in.") (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
8 WHITE HOUSE COMM'N ON AvIATION SAFETY AND SEC., FINAL REPORT TO PRESI-
DENT CLINTON § 3.19 (1997), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/212
fin-.html.
3 Ian David Fiske, Failing to Secure the Skies: Why America Has Struggled to Protect
Itself and How It Can Change, 15 VA. J.L. & TECH. 173, 180 (2010).
o Id.; Bankston & Gray, supra note 4 (internal quotation marks omitted).
41 Fiske, supra note 39, at 180.
42 See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Review of FAA
Passenger Screening Proposal Concludes It Won't Discriminate Against Airline
Travelers (Oct. 1, 1997), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/opa/pr/1997/Octo-
ber97/413cr.html [hereinafter U.S. Dep't of Justice Press Release].
43 Bankston & Gray, supra note 4 (explaining that confidential airline security
manuals were leaked, and that these manuals evidenced racial consideration).
4 See U.S. Dep't of Justice Press Release, supra note 42.
45 Fiske, supra note 39, at 180-81.
46 Michael J. DeGrave, Comment, Airline Passenger Profiling and the Fourth
Amendment: Will CAPPS II Be Cleared for Takeofpt, 10 B.U.J. Sci. & TECH. L. 125,
130-31 (2004).
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they did not check any baggage. 7 The 9/11 attacks reinstated
passenger and carry-on bag screening, but the CAPS program
remained inadequate 48 and ultimately became the starting point
for the newer Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System
(CAPPS II).49
C. CAPPS II
CAPPS II was a TSA-run passenger prescreening program that
originally received its authority from Congress's Aviation and
Transportation Security Act, which was passed in the aftermath
of 9/11.0 Due to U.S. citizens' and lawmakers' enhanced state
of fear, CAPPS II immediately took a much more aggressive ap-
proach than its predecessor by considering substantially more
passenger data in its evaluations. 5 ' CAPPS II was designed to col-
lect and analyze information from the government, airlines, and
other commercial sources to categorize passengers into one of
three levels of risk based on their individualized profiles. 2
CAPPS II sought to improve upon CAPS's failings.53 Reliance
on commercial data providers was intended to add a new level
of security-a way to confirm an individual's honesty in identifi-
cation and other reported data.5 4 Similarly, government sources
included criminal wanted lists and national security intelligence
reports for an individual passenger's name. 5 After the databases
collected the specific information, a passenger would receive a
color-coded risk score, which, like CAPS, would determine the
47 von Rochow-Leuschner, supra note 12, at 144-45.
48 See Paul Rosenzweig & Ha Nguyen, Backgrounder #1683: CAPPS II Should Be
Tested and Deployed, THE HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER (Aug. 28, 2003), http:/
/www.heritage.org/research/reports/2003/08/capps-ii-should-be-tested-and-
deployed.
49 Fiske, supra note 39, at 182-83.
50 49 U.S.C. § 44903(j) (2) (2006) ("The Secretary of Transportation shall en-
sure that the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System, or any successor
system-(i) is used to evaluate all passengers before they board an aircraft; and
(ii) includes procedures to ensure that individuals selected by the system and
their carry-on and checked baggage are adequately screened.").
51 Fiske, supra note 39, at 182-83.
52 Id. at 183. The levels were Green for "low-risk"; Yellow for average or un-
known risk; and Red for "high-risk" and potential no-fly orders. Leigh A. Kite,
Comment, Red Flagging Civil Liberties and Due Process Rights of Airline Passengers:
Will a Redesigned CAPPS II System Meet the Constitutional Challenge?, 61 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 1385, 1399 (2004).
53 Fiske, supra note 39, at 182.
54 Id. at 182-83.
55 Id.
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appropriate amount of screening that the individual would need
to undergo before flying.56 One article suggested that factors
under consideration "include [d] race, religion, political affilia-
tions, credit history, employment, spending habits, charitable
donations, unusual books purchased or checked out, and visits
to certain websites."5 ' But, as is the case with most security mea-
sures to date, the TSA expressed that the databases and the pre-
cise sources relied on were confidential. 8
Citing privacy invasions under the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments and the Privacy Act, critics' concerns focused on lack of
proper redress, general political fear of large government, and
concern about the effectiveness of such a process.5" Notably, the
system was viewed as an alarming "black box"60 where American
citizens' private lives were assessed in secret while travelers re-
mained unaware of the information the government retained
about them or how it translated into their "risk."6 ' The ACLU
and others also cited due process problems with refusing to al-
low passengers to pass through security without telling them why
or giving them a way to either defend themselves against their
supposed risk or prevent being judged by their peers.6 2
Advocacy groups also raised questions about the effectiveness
of the program.6 3 Specifically, the error rate, which the TSA ad-
mitted could be 4%, would generate many false alarms, which,
in addition to the due process concerns expressed above, would
then enlarge the pool of high-risk passengers.6 4 Such error dilu-
tion would diminish the importance of the high-risk label, creat-
ing a lower standard and defeating the purpose of the
program.
56 Bankston & Gray, supra note 4.
57 von Rochow-Leuschner, supra note 12, at 147.
58 Kite, supra note 52, at 1399.
59 See, e.g., von Rochow-Leuschner, supra note 12, at 149-53 (criticizing Fourth
Amendment precedent and suggesting CAPPS II will likely be construed to be
constitutional despite its novelty); DeGrave, supra note 46, at 133-34 (analyzing
the constitutionality of CAPPS II as a "search"); Kite, supra note 52, at 1398-99
(analyzing due process concerns of Red-coded passengers); The Seven Problems
with CAPPS II, ACLU (April 6, 2004), http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-lib-
erty/seven-problems-capps-ii (discussing the problem with the vast amount of se-
crecy involved in what data will be analyzed).
60 The Seven Problems with CAPPS II, supra note 59.
61 Id.
62 Id.; Kite, supra note 52, at 1398-1401.
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Finally, citizens exhibited fear and concern about the ad-
vanced level of the intelligence available and the potential "slip-
pery slope" that could result from this initial step.6 6 For instance,
while aviation security may be a justifiable concern, many citi-
zens might feel differently if local law enforcement agencies ob-
tained the information. Indeed, this result could raise
constitutional issues. Therefore, concerns about the TSA either
selling its accumulated information or risk scores to other law
enforcement agencies, or using the information for all means of
transportation, invoked public fear and skepticism."
Ultimately, the public's concerns spread to both the White
House and Congress, and the TSA was not able to satisfy the
public's demands regarding CAPPS II's requirements in time
for implementation.6 8 A little over one year after the TSA an-
nounced its plans for CAPPS II, Congress put a stop to its imple-
mentation until the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
could certify that the TSA could meet specific requirements." A
GAO report stated that, as of January 1, 2004, the TSA had not
addressed seven of the eight issues identified by Congress: accu-
racy of data, stress testing, abuse prevention, unauthorized ac-
cess prevention, policies for operation and use, privacy
concerns, and redress process.o In addition to congressional
challenges, the GAO report articulated three additional issues
that it foresaw as major impediments to CAPPS II's success: "de-
veloping the international cooperation needed to obtain passen-
ger data, managing the possible expansion of the program's
mission beyond its original purpose, and ensuring that identity
theft-in which an individual poses as and uses the information
of another individual-cannot be used to negate the security
benefits of the system."7 '
Due largely to the TSA's failure to fully address the issues
above, CAPPS II never came into existence. 7 2 But the TSA an-
nounced a re-brand of CAPPS II, called "Secure Flight," which
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-385, AVIATION SECURITY: COM-
PUTER-ASSISTED PASSENGER PRESCREENING SYSTEM FACES SIGNIFICANT IMPLEMENTA-
TION CHALLENGES 4-5 (2004).
69 The "Positive Profiling" Problem: Learning from the US. Experience, ACLU (Oct. 1,
2006), http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/positive-profiling-problem-
learning-us-experience.
70 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-385, supra note 68.
71 Id.
72 Fiske, supra note 39, at 183-85.
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focuses exclusively on anti-terrorism and only generates a "no-
fly" list, rather than individual assessments.73
D. SECURE FLIGHT
In August 2004, after CAPPS II failed, the TSA announced a
new program, Secure Flight.74 Initially, Secure Flight did not de-
liver as expected, due in large part to the TSA's inability to com-
ply with the Privacy Act or the requirements laid out by
Congress.75 Does this sound familiar yet? Perhaps now it will-a
major problem that the TSA faced was congressional disap-
proval of the TSA using commercial data in violation of the Pri-
vacy Act.76
Nevertheless, Secure Flight prevailed throughout this series of
mishaps and is now the screening system used for all domestic
commercial flights. 7 Significantly, Secure Flight is viewed by the
public as a scaled-back version of CAPPS II, confined to seeking
terrorists as opposed to analyzing all passengers. Like CAPS,
the program demands a passenger's travel information from air-
lines.79 Then, Secure Flight automatically compares the infor-
mation from the airlines to terrorist databasesso to ensure that
the passenger is not on any terrorist list." If the passenger is not
on a designated watch list, Secure Flight sends the results back




76 Improving Pre-Screening of Aviation Passengers Against Terrorists and Other Watch
Lists: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Econ. Sec., Infrastructure Protection, & Cyber-
security of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 109th Cong. 1, 3-4 (2005) [hereinafter
Improving Pre-Screening of Aviation Passengers] (statement of James Dempsey, Exec.
Dir. of Ctr. for Democracy & Tech.).
77 TSA: Secure Flight Program, TSA, http://www.tsa.gov/stakeholders/secure-
flight-program (last visited June 4, 2013).
78 Improving Pre-Screening of Aviation Passengers, supra note 76 at 3-4.
79 See Request for and Transmission of Information to TSA, 49 C.F.R.
§ 1560.101 (2012) (dictating the request of passenger information from airlines).
80 The terrorist lists referenced include TSA No-Fly and Selectee lists as well as
the list promulgated by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), an FBI-adminis-
tered group that reflects a collaboration between the Department of Justice,
DHS, and other members of the intelligence community. Fiske, supra note 39, at
187.
81 Mardi Ruth Thompson & Kapila Juthani, Providing Smarter Security and Cus-
tomer Service: TSA's Secure Flight and Registered Traveler Programs, 19 AIR & SPACE
LAw. 8, 8-9 (2005).
2013] 627
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to the airline to issue the boarding pass." Secure Flight is now
generally seen as a more successful version of the CAPS and
CAPPS II models because the program only identifies potential
names from terrorist watch lists8 3 and transfers authority to the
TSA to do such screening.84 Most significantly, its success results
from the fact that it does not use commercial data to evaluate a
passenger's risk."
E. LESSONs LEARNED
There are two important legacies arising from the privacy
struggles of these past programs that continue to haunt subse-
quent passenger profiling programs: (1) the European resis-
tance to cooperation; and (2) the public reaction. First, the U.S.
government will continue to struggle with trying to share data
with the European Union, which has stricter privacy laws than
the United States." In 2006, the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union struck down a passenger data sharing agreement
that a European Union commission had entered into with the
United States." Specifically, the Court found that the commis-
sion did not have the appropriate authority to authorize sharing
passenger information. The United States and the European
Union reached a new agreement that must be passed by Euro-
pean Parliament and that places restrictions on data use.8 ' This
agreement is important because the reality of the internationally
cooperative programs envisioned by organizations such as the
International Air Transport Association (IATA) and the Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) depends on the abil-
ity of countries to negotiate data sharing amongst themselves. 0
82 TSA: Secure Flight Program, How It Works, TSA, http://www.tsa.gov/stakehold-
ers/secure-flight-program (last visited June 4, 2013).
83 Improving Pre-Screening of Aviation Passengers, supra note 76, at 5.
84 TSA: Secure Flight Program, supra note 77.
85 Id.
86 See Press Release, European Ct. ofjustice, Judgment of the Court of Justice




89 See Commission Proposal for a Council Decision on the Conclusion of the Agreement
Between the United States of America and the European Union on the Use and Transfer of
Passenger Name Records to the United States Department of Homeland Security, COM
(2011) 807 final (Nov. 23, 2011), available at http://papersplease.org/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2011/11/eu-us-pnr-2011-en.pdf.
90 See infra Part IV.
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Second, and most significantly, it was the response of U.S. citi-
zens that spurred Congress and the Executive Branch to put
pressure on the TSA to meet their demands.91 Americans did
not know then, and may not understand even now, that the in-
formation they assume is private may be collected by multiple
commercial databases. Many Americans were driven by fear, the
idea that this information was private, and the thought that the
government was acting as "Big Brother."9 2 In reality, commercial
databases of personal information have already been compiled
through private companies, such as eBureau." In fact, the Fed-
eral Trade Commission (FTC) has recently announced that it
will begin analyzing these "data broker" companies for a greater
understanding of their practices, including the "nature and
sources" of the information collected; the method by which the
companies "use, maintain, and disseminate" the data; and the
accessibility of the information to consumers who would like to
either correct or opt out of the information collection.". Per-
haps it is because the public was largely unaware of the underly-
ing information collection techniques employed by these
brokers that many reacted quite severely to the thought of the
government having the information.95 However, the reality is
that similar information sharing occurs in the background of
most organizations, including other federal agencies. 6 Perhaps
even more telling is the difference in public pressure toward the
ATS as compared with CAPPS II. Particularly, while privacy ad-
vocates continue to challenge the ATS with meager success,"
CAPPS II was stopped in its tracks.99 This illustrates the discon-
nect in public attitudes toward "important" border-patrol safety
measures and the "inconvenient" or "invasive" domestic flight
security measures the TSA imposes.
9' See supra Part I.C.
92 See The Seven Problems with CAPPS II, supra note 59.
93 See About Us, EBUREAU, http://www.ebureau.com/about (last visited June 4,
2013).
94 Press Release, FTC, FTC to Study Data Broker Industry's Collection and Use
of Consumer Data (Dec. 18, 2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/
12/databrokers.shtm.
95 See supra Part I.C.
96 von Rochow-Leuschner, supra note 12, at 148.
97 See supra Part I.C.
98 See supra Part III.B-C.
9 See supra Part I.C.
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III. AIRLINE PASSENGERS AND THEIR RIGHT
TO PRIVACY
While the "right to privacy" is a familiar phrase to most citi-
zens, much confusion remains with respect to which aspects of
"privacy" are actually protected and which part of the U.S. Con-
stitution conveys such a right.100 An element of privacy is seem-
ingly apparent in the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.o' While these amend-
ments apply to specific situations in which citizens have a right
to be left alone in their affairs, the U.S. Supreme Court has ex-
pressly refused to find a "general" or broad right to privacy in
the Constitution.102
Nonetheless, in a famous dissenting opinion often invoked by
privacy advocates arguing for protection against government in-
trusion, 0 3 Justice Brandeis declared that the Constitution dic-
tates a "right to be let alone."'0 4 Through a functionalist analysis
of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution, Justice
Brandeis recalls the Founders' limited capability to predict tech-
nological advances that could constitute a "search" without any
physical intrusions.'0o Since then, the Supreme Court has in-
voked the right to privacy in socially controversial situations, the
100 See, e.g., NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 756--57, 756 n.10 (2011).
101 See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech."); id. amend. III ("No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quar-
tered in any house, without the consent of the Owner."); id. amend. IV ("The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized."); id. amend. V ("No person shall be ... compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.").
102 See Nelson, 131 S. Ct. at 756-57 ("[W]e will assume for present purposes that
the Government's challenged inquiries implicate a privacy interest of constitu-
tional significance. We hold, however, that whatever the scope of this interest, it
does not prevent the Government from asking" certain questions in a back-
ground check.).
103 See Privacy 6f Technology, ACLU OREGON, http://www.aclu-or.org/content/
privacy-technology (last visited June 4, 2013).
104 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
105 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 ("When the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were
adopted . . [florce and violence were then the only means known to man by
which government could directly effect self-incrimination.").
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backlash of which has been detrimental to the right's already
fragile existence.10 6 The right to privacy in the context of avia-
tion security's incorporation of technological advancements is
typically subject to the confines of the Fourth Amendment and
the Privacy Act.'
A. FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCHES IN THE AIRPORT CONTEXT
The current physical search proceduresos prompt most pri-
vacy challenges to airport security to invoke the Fourth Amend-
ment.o' The Fourth Amendment protects an individual's right
to not suffer unreasonable searches and seizures and "to be se-
cure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects." 0 While this
language includes mostly tangible property or areas,"' the U.S.
Supreme Court broadened the scope of this protection in Katz
v. United States, which overturned Olmstead (vindicating Justice
Brandeis's philosophy, some would argue)."1 The Court held
that "the Fourth Amendment protects people" and what they
seek to preserve as private, regardless of whether the search was
in a public area."' However, the majority clearly expressed that
the Fourth Amendment is not a "general right to privacy.""14
Courts have subsequently adopted Justice Harlan's test for
100 See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
107 While a due process analysis is a very worthwhile discussion of risk-based
security programs, this comment will not discuss its effect on the PreCheck pro-
gram because the PreCheck program is, for now, exclusively for low-risk passen-
gers. Therefore, PreCheck is not yet a means to deny travelers a seat on a plane.
See Kite, supra note 52, at 1393 (analyzing due process concerns of Red-coded
passengers).
108 Throughout the years, various procedures have been used, including pass-
ing through magnetometers, pat-downs, enhanced pat-downs, and, more re-
cently, Advanced Imaging Technology -(AIT), such as millimeter imaging
machines. See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 900 (9th Cir. 1973), overruled by
United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2007); Advanced Imaging Technology
(AIT), TSA, http://www.tsa.gov/traveler-information/advanced-imaging-technol-
ogy-ait (last updated May 21, 2013).
109 See, e.g., Jennifer Levine, Note, Over-Exposed? TSA Scanners and the Fourth
Amendment Right to Pyivacy, 16J. TECH. L. & POL'v 175, 186 (2011);Julie Solomon,
Comment, Does the TSA Have Stage Fright? Then Why Are They Picturing You Naked?,
73 J. AIR L. & COM. 643, 646 (2008).
110 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
111 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464-66 (1928), overruled by Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41
(1967).
112 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
113 Id. at 351.
114 Id. at 350-51.
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whether a warrantless search violates the Constitution: (1) a per-
son must show "an actual .. . expectation of privacy"; and (2) a
person must demonstrate "that the expectation [is] one that so-
ciety is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.""" While the
Fourth Amendment traditionally limited searches to those with
warrants, judicially crafted exceptions to the Fourth Amend-
ment have sufficiently eroded this view and have allowed for
substantial suspicion-free searches.' 1 6
Airport searches typically fall under an administrative excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment.' 7 Although airport security
screenings have passed Fourth Amendment scrutiny under
other theories, such as consent,"" reasonableness, or some com-
bination,"' the administrative search exception has recently
been more successfully invoked. 2 o For instance, the Ninth Cir-
cuit explicitly stated that airport screenings are administrative
since they are a "part of a general regulatory scheme in further-
ance of an administrative purpose" that focuses on eradicating
potential danger or violence on aircrafts, rather than on provid-
ing general crime control.' 2 ' Administrative searches, often re-
ferred to as "special needs" searches,12 2 are consistently held
constitutional even though they do not require a warrant, as
115 See, e.g., Ohio Civil Serv. Emp. Ass'n v. Seiter, 858 F.2d 1171, 1174-75 (6th
Cir. 1988); see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
116 Alexander A. Reinert, Revisiting "Special Needs" Theoly via Airport Searches, 106
Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 207, 208-09 (2012).
117 United States v. Marquez, 410 F.3d 612, 616 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing United
States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973)).
118 While the administrative search exception appears to be the most clear-cut
argument, the theory of consent plays a significant role in the Fourth Amend-
ment analysis. In Davis, the Ninth Circuit, through an administrative search anal-
ysis, included a requirement that a potential passenger must be able to avoid the
search by choosing not to fly. Davis, 482 F.2d at 910, 913. While subsequent
courts have expressed that consent is not necessary to validate an administrative
search, at least one court has recognized that the consent theory is not an appro-
priate avenue for upholding airport searches. United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d
799, 806-07 (2d Cir. 1974); see, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315
(1972). The Albarado court found that making a passenger choose between exer-
cising his or her Fourth Amendment right and flying simply amounts to coer-
cion. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799 at 806-07.
119 For an in-depth discussion of the various theories courts have relied upon
to uphold the constitutionality of airport screenings, see Reinert, supra note 116,
at 208.
120 See, e.g., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1,
10 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
121 United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 960 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Davis,
482 F.2d at 908).
122 Reinert, supra note 116, at 218 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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long as they meet certain requirements.1 2 3 As opposed to a typi-
cal search, administrative searches do not require "individual-
ized suspicion," 4 but they "must be reasonable."2 5
The Fourth Amendment standard of administrative airport
searches is not always consistent. The Ninth Circuit held that
specific airport security screening searches are reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment provided they are "'no more extensive
nor intensive than necessary, in the light of current technology,
to detect the presence of weapons or explosives,"' and if they
are "'confined in good faith to that purpose.'" 1 2 6
B. RECENT FOURTH AMENDMENT SCRUTINY OF
TECHNOLOGICAL SEARCHES
In Electronic Privacy Information Center v. U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (EPIC v. DHS), the D.C. Circuit expressly dis-
agreed with the Ninth Circuit by upholding the constitutionality
of the TSA's new Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) ma-
chines.22 The standard articulated by the D.C. Circuit was more
of a balancing test.'2 8 Specifically, whether an administrative
search occurred must be determined by weighing "'the degree
to which [the search] intrudes upon an individual's privacy and
... the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legiti-
mate governmental interests.' "129
The court's reasoning, 30 or lack thereof, is indicative of the
current deferential attitude demonstrated by courts confronted
with new forms of technology employed in airport screening.
The challenged technology included the X-ray backscatter scan-
123 New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702-03 (1987). The requirements are
laid out in Burger (1) substantial government interest exists that relates to the
regulatory scheme; (2) warrantless inspections are necessary to further the
scheme; and (3) the statute authorizing the warrantless search is a constitution-
ally adequate substitute for a warrant. See id.
124 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47-48 (2000).
125 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985); United States v. Marquez,
410 F.3d 612, 616 (9th Cir. 2005).
126 Aukai, 497 F.3d at 962 (quoting Davis, 482 F.2d at 913).
127 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1, 10 (D.C.
Cir. 2011). "In view of the Supreme Court's repeated refusal to declare that only
the least intrusive search practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment, ... we hold AIT screening does not violate the Fourth Amendment." Id.
(internal alterations and quotation marks omitted).
128 See id.
129 Id. (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119 (2001)).
130 See id.
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ner and the millimeter radio wave scanner.1 3' Both machines
were heavily criticized as overly invasive when introduced in
2007.132 The public expressed concern about TSA employees
observing their naked bodies and about whether the images
would be stored.' 3 3 The court found that the government won
the balancing test, due in large part to the particular impor-
tance of security.134 The court also noted that the TSA had taken
certain steps to avoid potential privacy concerns.'3 5 Of particular
importance to the court was that the passenger had a choice-
because he retained the right to refuse the scanners and receive
a pat-down,33 but this is arguably no choice at all. In its brief
opinion, the court did not discuss the underlying reasons why a
passenger may feel violated, or whether such feelings were rea-
sonable. Thus, with almost total deference to the government's
interest in maintaining security in the skies, the court failed to
analyze whether the technology-based body-scan approach was
an unreasonable or unnecessary way to achieve passenger safety.
EPIC v. DHS suggests that the Fourth Amendment will offer little
protection to citizens who feel that their privacy has been in-
vaded by technological advancements in airport searches.
131 Id. at 3-4.
132 See Principles for Evaluating Physical Screening Techniques and Technologies Con-
sistent with Constitutional Norms: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Timothy Sparapani, Legisla-
tive Council, ACLU); see also Carol Cratty, TSA Trying New Airline Passenger Screen-
ing Machine, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2007), http://www.cnn.com/2007/TRAVEL/
10/11/airport.screening/index.html (Barry Steinhardt referred to the machines
as an "'assault on the essential dignity of passengers that citizens in a free nation
should not have to tolerate."').
133 Cratty, supra note 132.
134 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 10.
135 Id. The TSA has taken further steps to improve privacy due to a congres-
sional mandate. The millimeter wave machines have new software installations
that eliminate the individual's actual image, replacing it with a general human
outline containing illuminations where problem areas may exist. TSA: AIT: Pri-
vacy, TSA, http://www.tsa.gov/ait-privacy (last visited June 4, 2013). Notably, the
TSA appears committed to these initiatives, and it has now ordered removal of
the backscatter machines because the companies could not formulate similar
software in time. Jeff Plungis, Naked-Image Scanners to Be Removed from U.S. Airports,
BLOOMBERG (June 4, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-18/na-
ked-image-scanners-to-be-removed-from-u-s-airports.html.
136 Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., 653 F.3d at 10.
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C. THE PRIVACY ACT AND CHALLENGES TO PASSENGER
PROFILING SYSTEMS
Due to claims that public notice of the specific criteria consid-
ered in determining individual passengers' risk levels would
make airports and aircraft more vulnerable to terrorists, an
ongoing struggle exists between electronic searches, the files
they create, and the Privacy Act of 1974 (Privacy Act).'3 The
Privacy Act requires federal agencies to publish in the Federal
Register a description of each system of records that the agency
maintains, including the character and categories of informa-
tion."" The agency must also describe the uses of the informa-
tion.'39 The purpose. of this mandate. is to protect individual
privacy so that each individual better understands how his or
her information is being used and has the opportunity to cor-
rect any inaccuracies.1 4 0
EPIC v. DHS recently held that to bring a claim under the
Privacy Act, an individual must demonstrate that a specific re-
trieval of personal data occurred-one cannot simply offer evi-
dence that the agency had the capability to retrieve such data.141
In that case, the fact that EPIC could prove that the AIT ma-
chines were still capable of saving images (and indeed had done
so for training purposes) was insufficient; the D.C. Circuit re-
quired the plaintiff to show that the TSA actually created and
maintained images of specific individuals,'4 2 which a traveler has
no practical way of discovering.
The Privacy Act expressly articulates various reasons why agen-
cies may exempt certain records systems."'4 When the DHS fi-
nally published a Notice of Record Keeping for the ATS,144 it
simultaneously filed a proposed rulemaking stating that most of
the information files collected would be exempted from "the
Privacy Act because of criminal, civil, and administrative en-
137 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012).
138 Id. § 552a(e) (4).
139 Id.
140 Henke v. Dep't of Commerce, 83 F.3d 1453, 1456 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing 5
U.S.C. § 552a(d) (2)).
141 Elec. Privacy Info. Cr., 653 F.3d at 8.
142 Id. at 8-10.
143 See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)-(k).
144 See Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records, 71 Fed. Reg. 64,543 (Nov. 2,
2006).
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forcement requirements."1 4 5 The announcement of the final
rule ignored protests by privacy advocates and successfully
barred individuals from learning the substance of such
records. 1 6 Likewise, the TSA followed suit by publishing in the
Federal Register its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to exempt
its Secure Flight records from the Privacy Act; this Notice ulti-
mately became a final rule. 14 7
Lawsuits have challenged the ability of government agencies
to exempt themselves from Privacy Act liability;14 8 however,
there remains a split in authority. 149 Recently, the Sixth Circuit,
in Shearson v. Department of Homeland Security, joined the D.C. Cir-
cuit"5 o in holding that government agencies do not have an ab-
solute right to exempt their records under the Privacy Act.1 5 '
These two courts have offered litigants at least a chance to chal-
lenge government security agencies and their authority under
the Privacy Act.
IV. TSA'S NEWEST RISK-BASED APPROACH TO
SECURITY: PRECHECK
A. INTERNATIONAL AvIATION OBJECTIVES
A current goal of international aviation, termed the "Check-
point of the Future," seeks to create a scenario where passengers
will have a nonstop walk from their cars until they board a
plane.'5 2 According to Tony Tyler, Director General and CEO of
145 See Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Automated Target-
ing System, 72 Fed. Reg. 43,567 (proposed Aug. 6, 2007) (to be codified at 6
C.F.R. pt. 5).
146 See Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Dep't of Homeland
Sec./U.S. Customs and Border Protection-006 Automated Targeting System of
Records, 75 Fed. Reg. 5487, 5490 (Feb. 3, 2010) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 5);
see also Sniffen, supra note 23.
147 Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Secure Flight Records,
72 Fed. Reg. 48,397 (Aug. 23, 2007); Secure Flight Program, TSA, http://www.tsa.
gov/stakeholders/secure-flight-program (last visited June 4, 2013).
148 See, e.g., Shearson v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 638 F.3d 498 (6th Cir. 2011);
Hasbrouck v. Customs & Border Prot., No. C 10-3793 RS, 2012 WL 177563 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 23, 2012).
149 Compare Alexander v. United States, 787 F.2d 1349, 1351-52 (9th Cir.
1986), and Kimberlin v. Dep't of Justice, 788 F.2d 434, 436 n.2 (7th Cir. 1986),
and Ryan v. Dep't ofJustice, 595 F.2d 954, 958 (4th Cir. 1979), with Shearson, 638
F.3d at 504, and Doe v. FBI, 936 F.2d 1346, 1352-53 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
15o See Doe, 936 F.2d 1346.
151 Shearson, 638 F.3d at 504.
152 Checkpoint of the Future, IATA, http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/security/
pages/checkpoint-future.aspx (last visitedJune 4, 2013). The goals of the Check-
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IATA, 15 3 the Checkpoint of the Future is a risk-based and intelli-
gence-driven approach to airport security, rather than a "one-
size-fits-all" approach. 154 According to the Checkpoint Roadmap
published by IATA, "[u]ninterrupted passenger flow" and
"[s] creening based on risk assessment" should be in place by the
year 2020.155 More immediately, the 2014 Roadmap includes the
following goals for risk assessment: "use of passenger data" to
prescreen travelers; "[c]overt and overt behavior analysis tech-
niques"; trusted traveler programs; separate checkpoint systems;
and methods to minimize random prerequisites.1 5 6 Essentially,
the international aviation goal is to replace physical security
screenings with a prescreening of each individual's risk through
analysis of provided information.'15
This new goal brings a new challenge-privacy concerns. The
Checkpoint of the Future, as Tyler concedes, will require "fuller
use of passenger information" but not "the [forced] collection
of more information"; the program will "only [give] better effect
to the information that is already mandated by governments ...
[and] supplement[ the information] with voluntary 'known tray-
eler' programs."5" The passenger data Tyler refers to is ob-
tained "for border control purposes,"5 9 which is currently very
different from data collected for U.S. domestic flights or general
security purposes.16 0 Of utmost significance is the fact that CBP
uses commercial and law enforcement data, which domestic
point of the Future are strengthened security, increased operational efficiency,
and improved passenger experience. Id.
153 CEO Biography: Tony Tyler, Director General and CEO, IATA, http://www.iata.
org/pressroom/Pages/ceo-biography.aspx (last visited June 4, 2013).
154 Tony Tyler, Gen. Dir. & CEO, IATA, Remarks at the World Passenger Sym-
posium in Abu Dhabi (Oct. 16, 2012).
155 Checkpoint of the Future Roadmap, IATA, http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/se-
curity/Documents/Roadmap.pdf (last visited June 4, 2013) [hereinafter
Roadmap]. The 2020 risk assessment goals include: (1) "[p]assenger and flight
data risk assessments with international cooperation"; (2) "(u]npredictable alter-
native measures to deter and detect"; (3) "[a]utomated behavior analysis with
real-time update of the risk score"; and (4) "[m]ultilateral known traveler pro-
gram and differentiated checkpoint screening." Id.
156 Id.
157 See id.
158 Tyler, supra note 154.
159 Id.
160 Scott Mayerowitz, Airport Security Needs Radical Overhaul, Airlines Execs Say,
USA TODAY (Oct. 16, 2012, 10:22 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/
flights/2012/ 10/16/airport-security-needs-radical-overhaul-airline-execs-say/
1636177/; see supra Part II (comparing the ATS with Secure Flight).
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flights, through Secure Flight, expressly do not have congres-
sional authority to use.'
While Tyler claims the expanse of passenger data use "is not a
show-stopper,"' 6 2 he admits it is a "sensitive subject"e's that "will
require legislative change in many [s] tates." 6 4 However, Tyler
cites "'known traveler' programs" as a definitive step toward the
Checkpoint of the Future,' 5 including the CBP's Trusted Trav-
eler Programs and the TSA's new PreCheck program."6 6
CBP has in place several Trusted Traveler Programs, which
"provide expedited travel for pre-approved, low risk travelers
through dedicated lanes and kiosks."' 7 CBP created Global En-
try for pre-approved frequent international travelers who agree
to a $100 fee,16 s a "rigorous background check[,] and [an] inter-
view."' During the interview, the passenger is asked questions,
has his or her picture taken, and is asked to give biometric infor-
mation, such as fingerprints or iris scans.17 0 Although the eligi-
bility requirements are unknown, the website lists several factors
that result in guaranteed ineligibility, such as "provid [ing] false
... information," "hav[ing] been convicted of any criminal of-
fense," or more broadly, failing to "satisfy CBP of their low-risk
status (e.g. CBP has intelligence that indicates that the applicant
is not low risk; [or] CBP cannot determine an applicant's crimi-
nal, residence or employment history)."1 7 ' Despite the unclear
application guidelines, Global Entry has been popular: the CBP
161 See supra Part II (comparing the ATS with Secure Flight).
162 Tyler, supra note 154.
163 Id.
164 IATA, CHECKPOINT OF THE FUTURE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 7 (last visited June
4, 2013), available at http://www.iata.org/whatwedo/security/Documents/COF-
Concept-Definition-Executive-Summary.pdf.
165 Tyler, supra note 154 (internal quotation marks omitted).
166 Mayerowitz, supra note 160.
167 Trusted Traveler Prograns, CBP, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/ travel/
trusted traveler/ (last visited June 4, 2013). The website lists the included pro-
grams: Global Entry, NEXUS, SENTRI, and FAST: Free and Secure Trade Pro-
gram. Id.
168 Stephanie Rosenbloom, Speedy Airport Security, Should You Apply ?, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 3, 2012), http://travel.nytimes.com/2012/10/0 7 /travel/speedy-airport-se-
curity-should-you-apply.html?ref=airportsecurity&r=0.
169 About, GLOBAL ENTRY, http://www.globalentry.gov/about.html (last visited
June 4, 2013).
170 How to Apply, GLOBAL ENTRY, http://www.globalentry.gov/howtoapply.html
(last visited June 4, 2013).
171 Eligibility, GLOBAL ENTRY, http://www.globalentry.gov/eligibility.html (last
visited June 4, 2013).
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has "receive[d] 25,000 to 30,000 applications [per] month."1 2
Notably, the number of Global Entry applicants is likely to in-
crease because entry into that program leads to automatic quali-
fication for the TSA's domestic PreCheck program.1 7 3
B. TSA PRECHECK
In accordance with international aviation security goals, the
TSA has been preparing to shift toward a more risk-based ap-
proach to security measures. For example, the TSA is relying on
biometrics;17 4 PreCheck; an expanded Behavior Detection Pi-
lot;1 75 and decreased screening for passengers who are "75 and
[o]lder," "12 and [u]nder," and "[a]ctive [d]uty U.S. Service
Members."1 7 6 However, PreCheck is the risk-based program that
the TSA is making the most noise about.177
PreCheck is a program that allows "expedited screening" at
airport checkpoints for enrolled passengers who are willing to
provide the TSA with personal information and undergo a risk
assessment based on the provided information."17 Athough enti-
tlement to expedited screening will be granted when a
PreCheck member books his or her flight, the passenger will not
be aware of the assessment results because the approval will be
"embedded" in the boarding pass's barcode."'7 Crucial to the
integrity of the program is the principle that a member should
be subject to "random, unpredictable security measures" and
should not know whether he or she will receive expedited
172 Rosenbloom, supra note 168.
173 Id.
174 Security Technologies, TSA, http://www.tsa.gov/about-tsa/security-technolo-
gies#bio (last visitedJune 4, 2013).
175 Michael S. Schmidt & Eric Lichtblau, Racial Profiling at Airport, U.S. Officers
Say, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/12/us/ra-
cial-profiling-at-boston-airport-officials-say.html?_r=1&.
176 Risk-Based Security Initiatives, TSA, http://www.tsa.gov/traveler-informatioi/
risk-based-security-initiatives (last visited June 4, 2013). In addition, the TSA has
recently announced that it will allow passengers to bring pocketknives, box cut-
ters, and limited sports equipment on the plane, crediting its decision as part of a
risk-based initiative. Mike M. Ahlers, TSA to Allow Pocketknives, Some Sports Equip-
ment, CNN (Mar. 5, 2013, 6:36 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/05/travel/
tsa-carry-on-changes/index.html.
177 John S. Pistole, Adm'r, TSA, Remarks to the National Press Club:
Counterterrorism, Risk-Based Security and TSA's Vision for the Future of Avia-
tion Security (Mar. 5, 2012), available at http://www.tsa.gov/press/speeches/
counterterrorism-risk-based-security-and-tsa-vision-future-aviation-security.
178 TSA Pre/Tm How It Works, supra note 14.
179 Id.
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screening on any given trip.18 o When the member presents his
or her boarding pass to a TSA employee, the employee will send
that member to either the full-security lane or a special
PreCheck queue, as instructed by the barcode."' The expedited
screening offered in the PreCheck line may include allowing
passengers to keep shoes, light jackets, and belts on, and keep
liquid "3-1-1 compliant bag[s] . . . [and] laptop[s]" in carry-
ons.182
PreCheck is not for everyone. In fact, PreCheck is currently
only available to certain CBP Trusted Travelers and frequent fly-
ers of specific airlines.'8 3 Global Entry participants and members
of Trusted Traveler Programs such as NEXUS' 8 4 and SENTRI'85
are allowed to enroll in PreCheck, subject to eligibility.'8 6 Alter-
natively, only frequent fliers on the following airlines are cur-
rently offered membership in the program: Alaska Airlines,
American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, Hawaiian Airlines, United
Airlines, US Airways, and Virgin America.18 7
As the TSA hoped, PreCheck has grown to be quite popular
among the public, easily meeting the program's milestones to
date."' The TSA successfully met its 2012 goal, with PreCheck




183 TSA PreTM FAQs, TSA, http://www.tsa.gov/tsa-precheck/tsa-precheck-faqs
(last visited Oct. 28, 2013); but see Press Release, TSA, TSA to Launch Application
Program for TSA Pre/TM (July 19, 2013), http://www.tsa.gov/press/releases/
2013/07/19/tsa-launch-application-program-tsa-precheck.
184 NEXUS is a program for registered, prescreened travelers who will experi-
ence expedited screening at the border of the United States and Canada; many
members are Canadian citizens. See Nexus Program Description, CBP, http://www.
cbp.gov/xp/cgov/travel/trusted-traveler/nexusprog/nexus.xml (last visited
June 4, 2013).
185 SENTRI is the Mexican border counterpart to the NEXUS program dis-
cussed above, except the TSA does not allow Mexican citizens. to enroll in
PreCheck as ofJanuary 2013. See Sentri Program Description, CBP, http://www.cbp.
gov/xp/cgov/travel/trusted_traveler/sentri/ (last visited June 4, 2013).
186 Press Release, TSA, Canadian NEXUS Members Now Eligible for TSA
Pre/Tm (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.tsa.gov/press/releases/2012/11/15/cana-
dian-nexus-members-now-eligible-tsa-precheck.
187 TSA PreTm Expedited Screening, supra note 13.
188 Press Release, TSA, TSA Pre/m Hits 3 Million Mark (Sept. 25, 2012),
http://www.tsa.gov/press/releases/2012/09/25/tsa-precheck-hits-3-million-
mark.
189 Press Release, TSA, TSA Pre/"'m Now Available at 35 Airports Nationwide:
Expedited Screening Begins atJohn Wayne Airport (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.
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growth is also indicated by the fact that the TSA had already
screened 3 million passengers by September 2012.100 PreCheck
is even the subject of marketing for businesses.' For example,
Loews Hotels & Resorts, with others soon to follow, has offered
its loyalty rewards customers the payment of PreCheck's $100
application fee to ease their travel experience.1 9 2 The program's
success is important because, according to TSA leadership, it is
indicative of the future move toward the IATA's goal of achiev-
ing a risk-based intelligence structure.'9 3 According to TSA Ad-
ministrator John Pistole, PreCheck strengthens security because
the TSA's "ability to find the proverbial needle in the haystack is
improved every time [it is] able to reduce the size of the
haystack.""'
As with all previous programs, critics point out the potential
failings of PreCheck and, in a broader context, all Trusted Trav-
eler Programs. Privacy advocates are zealously attacking such
programs as ineffective and dangerous to privacy, even though
they are currently voluntary."'
First, similar to the ATS and Secure Flight, the TSA has ex-
empted Registered Traveler files from the Privacy Act."' The
rationale for this exemption is that "disclosure would also per-
mit the individual who is the subject of a record to impede the
program suitability determination."1 9 7 As discussed above, con-
cerns generally arise from the secrecy involved in judging an in-
dividual's risk without allowing access to the information used to
judge such risk.19 8 Considering PreCheck functions to benefit
tsa.gov/press/releases/2012/12/19/tsa-precheck-now-available-35-airports-na-
tionwide-expedited-screening-begins.
9o TSA Pre/m Hits 3 Million Mark, supra note 188.
191 Rosenbloom, supra note 168.
192 Id.
193 Roger Yu, TSA Tests 'Pre-Screening' of Select Passengers at 4 Airports, USA TODAY
(Oct. 4, 2011), http://travel.usatoday.com/flights/story/2011-10-04/TSA-tests-
pre-screening-of-select-passengers-at-4-airports/50660780/1. "[PreCheck] is de-
signed to test a possible shift to a method of screening of passengers that relies
more on intelligence and a risk-assessment of travelers." Id.
194 Pistole, Remarks to the National Press Club, supra note 177.
195 Stanley, TSA Once Again Considering Using Commercial Data to Profile Passen-
gers, supra note 17.
196 Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Registered Traveler
Operations Files, 70 Fed. Reg. 33,383, 33,383 (June 8, 2005) (codified at 49
C.F.R. pt. 1507).
197 See TSA Exempts Registered Traveler Files from Disclosure, 82 No. 24 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1002, 1003 (June 13, 2005) [hereinafter Immigration Report].
198 See supra Part III.D; see also Kite, supra note 52, at 1434 (discussing due pro-
cess implications).
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mainly "low-risk" passengers without forcing any individual to
forfeit his ability to fly,199 the exemption alone did not initially
raise concerns. But the DHS recently announced that it is ad-
ding a new watch list to its Secure Flight list-a watch list culti-
vated from none other than those disqualified from
PreCheck. 0
Second, privacy advocates argue that this will create a two-tier
class of passengers that could lead to a slippery slope of discrimi-
nation against minorities.2 1 Third, there are concerns that the
cost expended will not be worth the benefit received, a lesson
learned from previous failures. 202 These concerns may be cor-
rect, because a fourth criticism centers around a security failure
that has already occurred.2 0 s Specifically, TSA has not properly
encrypted the bar code that determines whether a passenger re-
ceives expedited screening for a particular flight.2" Therefore,
simple computer programs could de-code and essentially give
someone a free pass through security.
C. PRECHECK'S NEw ANNOUNCEMENT FOR PRIVATE
INFORMATION GATHERERS
The final and most significant concern stems from a recent
announcement that the TSA will incorporate commercial data
into its assessments under the PreCheck program.0 The TSA
released a Market Research Announcement206 that sought bids
from private third-party companies to create a system that can
199 TSA Pre/n' How It Works, supra note 14.
200 Privacy Act of 1974: System of Records; Secure Flight Records, 77 Fed. Reg.
69,491, 69,492-94 (Nov. 19, 2012) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1507); Allya Stern-
stein, Passengers Disqualified from New Speed-Screening Program Will Go on Watch List,
NEXTGOV (Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.nextgov.com/defense/2012/11/passen-
gers-disqualified-new-speed-screening-program-will-go-watch-list/59889/.
201 Stanley, TSA Once Again Considering Using Commercial Data to Profile Passen-
gers, supra note 17.
202 Jay Stanley, Why the "Registered Traveler" Program Will Not Make Airline Passen-
gers Any Safer, ACLU (Aug. 17, 2006), http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-lib-
erty/why-registered-traveler-program-will-not-make-airline-passengers-any-safer.
203 James Ball, Experts Warn About Security Flaws in Airline Boarding Passes, WASH.
POST (Oct. 23, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-10-23/national/
35502739_1 security-flaws-security-measures-tsa.
204 Id.
205 Stanley, TSA Once Again Considering Using Commercial Data to Profile Passen-
gers, supra note 17.
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assess risk for the PreCheck program using a private source of
commercial data.o7 Particularly, the TSA is interested in evaluat-
ing techniques that use "non-governmental data elements to
generate an assessment of the risk" while the "TSA [specifies] a
few common core requirements for process and algorithm
content."208
V. CAN PRECHECK SURVIVE IN A POST-CAPPS II
AMERICA?
In the words of TSA Administrator Pistole, "For the first time
since 9/11, I think we have the conditions where it might be
politically possible to have a serious debate about" risk-based in-
telligence assessments of travelers. 2 09 First, does Mr. Pistole
know something that the public does not? Part II of this com-
ment analyzed government-implemented risk-based and profil-
ing systems from the past decade, and it revealed that each
system was met with continuous public resistance. 2 10 The list of
systems discussed was limited due to the exclusion of the private
prescreening systems that have floundered and failed for
years. 1 Second, why would travelers feel more ready to "dis-
cuss" risk-based, intrusive measures now, when the fear of ter-
rorists hijacking planes is likely at its lowest point since 9/11? To
answer this question, one must analyze more than just the
PreCheck program. PreCheck must be framed by its predeces-
sors and by the unique result of a decade of struggle between
security and liberty, where the strength of law is unknown and is
often superceded by the overwhelming authority of the U.S. gov-
ernment in combating terrorism. 12
207 See id.
208 Id. The elements required by the TSA include full legal name, gender, date
of birth, and the prospective enrollee's waiver to search various commercial
databases. Desirable elements include current address, most recent past address,
current employer, names used in the past, Social Security number, positive iden-
tity verification, and images on identification provided by the PreCheck enrollee.
Id.
20 Susan Stellin, Support Grows for Tiered Screening at Airports, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/08/business/08security.html?_r=O.
210 See supra Part II.
211 One example is a program called Clear; it had financial troubles and an
extraordinary problem with data protection in the hands of failed management.
Bankruptcy of Venfied Identity Pass and the Privacy of Clear Registered Traveler Data,
EPIC, http://epic.org/privacy/airtravel/clear/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2013). The
company experienced bankruptcy, an immediate closing of its doors, and stolen
passenger information. Id.
212 See, e.g., Kite, supra note 52.
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A. PRECHECK + SECURE FLIGHT + COMMERCIAL DATA = CAPPS
II REINCARNATED
It is fair to say that the public is ready to discuss PreCheck. It
is a typically well-liked program2 13 because of the convenience
associated with membership. But one must actually break down
what it accomplishes. 2 14 Today, PreCheck is more or less a volun-
tary background check that the government runs on travelers-
using information provided by individual travelers-to confirm
that they are who they say they are.2 15 Additionally, PreCheck is
a "positive" profiling experience because it allows passengers to
reap benefits from leading scandal-free lives. The individual
traveler, as a responsible citizen, has a sense of control over the
process. He chooses to let the TSA deem him "safe" to fly.
There are additional relevant facts, though. For instance, the
DHS will place an individual on a watch list should he somehow
not appear to be as "low-risk" as when he originally applied for
the PreCheck program.1 6 Couple that issue with the reality that
he would then have a difficult, if not impossible, time trying to
determine which piece of data from his past landed him on such
a list.2 17 The potential movement toward including commercial
data in the evaluation process218 would place the passenger at a
loss because the TSA could have based its decision on an endless
amount of unknown data not limited to information that he
provided. What does the TSA think is so risky about this poten-
tial traveler? Suddenly left in the dark about his own ability to
fly, this potential traveler may ultimately regret ever volunteer-
ing his information to the TSA for mere convenience.
CAPPS II never came to life for two main reasons: (1) the
public, led by the Legislative and Executive Branches, was not
comfortable with the government's reliance on ordinary law en-
forcement and commercial data to evaluate them; and (2) the
use of a computerized system to assign one of three levels of risk
to all traveling citizens invoked fears of due process and other
constitutional violations.2 19 The combination of the two reasons
213 TSA Pre/n^ Hits 3 Million Mark, supra note 188.
214 See Rosenbloom, supra note 168.
215 Id.
216 Sternstein, supra note 200.
217 See Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Registered Traveler
Operations Files, 70 Fed. Reg. 33,383, 33,385 (June 8, 2005) (codified at 49
C.F.R. pt. 1507).
218 See TSA Third Party Pre-screening, supra note 206.
219 See, e.g., Kite, supra note 52.
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simply translated to an "overreach [ing] of intelligence"; 2 20 the
public was not ready to accept the idea that its government*
would have the type of power it perceived in CAPPS II's capabili-
ties. Passengers would no longer have choices or control over
whether they even wanted to be rated "safe" by their
government.
How is current aviation security different than that proposed
by CAPPS II? The TSA's recent announcement exhibits the like-
lihood that commercial databases, so forcefully rejected before,
will be considered yet again.2 2 1 And even though citizens are no
longer automatically grouped into three categories, as CAPPS II
proposed,2 they will be grouped just that way for all practical
purposes.2 2 ' The TSA promotes PreCheck's expansion to all eli-
gible passengers, notjust frequent flyers of particular airlines. 224
Additionally, the IATA's goals stem from the same desire for ex-
pansion.2 25 Therefore, in a matter of years, the TSA plans for
many individuals with clear backgrounds to be deemed "low-
risk"2 26 in the TSA's view, minimizing the "haystack" that Pistole
alluded to. 2 27 Also, the "high-risk" passenger group compiled by
Secure Flight will be comprised of those who exhibit risky char-
acteristics or were rejected from the PreCheck program. Lastly,
passengers whose risk level is described as "average" or "un-
known" will include individuals who either do not fly regularly
or do not meet the unknown "safe" requirements necessary to
be categorized as low-risk. An individual, for all practical pur-
poses, will be a member of one of these three groups. Do the
CAPPS II colors of Red, Green, and Yellow come to mind? This
comparison is made to point out that the TSA PreCheck pro-
gram may ultimately fulfill the goals of the failed CAPPS II.
With proper perspective, it is clear why there will be difficul-
ties in assessing the constitutionality of PreCheck and the
"Checkpoint of the Future" initiatives in general. CAPPS II cer-
220 Fiske, supra note 39, at 184.
221 See TSA Third Party Pre-screening, supra note 206.
222 Fiske, supra note 39, at 184.
223 See Stellin, supra note 209.
224 See TSA Pre/ T ^ Hits 3 Million Mark, supra note 188.
225 See, e.g., DeGrave, supra note 46, at 140-44.
226 See Fiske, supra note 39, at 183 (describing the CAPPS II color-coded levels
as Green for "low-risk"; Yellow for average or unknown risk; and Red for "high-
risk" and potential no-fly orders).
227 Pistole, Remarks to the National Press Club, supra note 177.
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tainly invoked legal challenges, 228 but was stopped in its tracks
0only by political pressures, not constitutional hurdles. 2 2 9
B. FOURTH AMENDMENT SCRUTINY
To hold that the prescreening capacity of PreCheck is an un-
constitutional search under the Fourth Amendment, a court
must first ask whether it is a search as intended under the
Fourth Amendment. Therefore, under the Katz analysis, a court
would look to (1) whether an individual has an actual expecta-
tion of privacy, and (2) whether society recognizes that expecta-
tion as reasonable. 23 0 This would potentially be the first hurdle
for any challengers because, as long as PreCheck is voluntary, a
court will likely find that a person would not be able to show an
actual expectation of privacy. However, to the extent that an-
other program invokes commercial databases, as PreCheck has
suggested it may, a passenger may very well expect that particu-
lar details of his financial situation would not become knowl-
edge of the TSA simply because he chooses to fly. As PreCheck
stands now, however, it will likely not even constitute a search
worthy of constitutional protection under legal precedent.
Even if PreCheck, or any other risk-based program, is indeed
a search, it would likely fall into one of the exceptions carved
from the Fourth Amendment's ban on warrantless searches.3
First, to the extent that PreCheck remains voluntary, courts will
undoubtedly uphold the program due to the consent excep-
232tion. Furthermore, even if PreCheck became a mandatory
screening program, a court still might hold that a passenger
consented because he had a choice to not fly.2"3 Courts have yet
to recognize the right of an individual to choose to travel by
plane.2 3 4 While there is a valid due process issue in that assump-
tion, it is sufficient to say that passengers likely have no claims
under the Fourth Amendment.23 5
228 See, e.g., DeGrave, supra note 46, at 141-44; von Rochow-Leuschner, supra
note 12, at 168-72 (criticizing Fourth Amendment precedent and suggesting
CAPPS II will likely be construed to be constitutional despite its novelty); Kite,
supra note 52 (analyzing due process concerns of Red-coded passengers).
229 Fiske, supra note 39, at 183-84.
230 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
231 See supra Part III.
232 See, e.g., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 653 F.3d 1,






While technology has made the nature of a search completely
different than any. of our Founding Fathers could have
imagined, the core reasoning behind PreCheck's electronic
searches is parallel to the goal of physical searches: to alleviate
the dangers of flying. 23 6 Therefore, just like its predecessor, AIT
imaging,3 7 PreCheck's informational searches will likely fall
squarely into the administrative search exception, under either
of the standards courts currently use.23 8 If passenger prescreen-
ing is categorized as an administrative search, a court will likely
find that it falls within the confines of the Fourth Amend-
ment.23 9 Particularly in light of the deference given by the court
in EPIC v. DHS, it seems that the government's interest in secur-
ing the nation against terrorists will overcome almost any level
of intrusiveness on the government's part.240
Ultimately, the Fourth Amendment precedent sets up an ex-
tremely low hurdle for the TSA in crafting search techniques.
The administrative search exception, the consent exception,
and the strong governmental interest in security effectively cre-
ate an atmosphere where almost any government action is con-
stitutionally acceptable. As technology advances, it is becoming
less appropriate to gauge the propriety of potentially serious in-
vasions under the Fourth Amendment. While judges have ex-
panded the Fourth Amendment's literal language to mean
more than the Framers likely contemplated, there is no indica-
tion that the Fourth Amendment and its precedential standards
are flexible enough to accommodate the intricate details of
complex data sharing systems or to overcome the huge govern-
mental interest in safety. If the judicial test is a balance, the gov-
ernment will always win in court.
Importantly, however, Congress is a political body with the
ability to codify a stricter definition of privacy that ideally cap-
236 See supra Part III.
237 Id.
238 An issue that is beyond the scope of this comment is the potential for the
government to find misleading or false documents that do not affect aviation
security but could be used as evidence for another crime. While physical evidence
(i.e., drugs) has been routinely collected in physical airport screening despite its
"administrative goals," it would be interesting to examine whether an informa-
tional search could also recover and use such information against the traveler for
purposes such as aiding the IRS in determining whether an individual has com-
mitted tax fraud.
239 See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 892 F. Supp. 2d
28, 50-52 (D.D.C. 2012).
240 Id.
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tures the Fourth Amendment's spirit in today's evolving world.
As mentioned above, the FTC is currently studying commercial
databases to better understand the industry.241 As the public be-
comes more aware of the information collected about them,
travelers should decide whether they feel comfortable with the
TSA evaluating them based on this and other unknown informa-
tion. Considering the public's discomfort with prior profiling
programs, citizens should recognize the constitutional weakness
of the Fourth Amendment and express political concerns to
their congressmen, as Congress is where the only available solu-
tion lies.
C. THE PRIVACY ACT'S WEAKNESSES
While the Privacy Act was originally intended to protect the
rights of citizens from a government that maintains secret
records of them, its ambiguous application with respect to pas-
senger screening systems and aviation security in general is con-
cerning. Allowing the Privacy Act to be easily circumvented
through its exceptions, like many courts have done for the sake
of fighting terror, shows that our society is still consumed by
fear. Under the current standard, for up to forty years, citizens
have either no right or a very limited right to know what records
the DHS may keep about them.2 4 2
Applied to electronic searches, it is significant that the ATS
went unreported in the Federal Register for years before CBP
found it necessary to make it public. 243 This is directly contrary
to the Privacy Act's requirements and ideals.24 4 Additionally, the
multiple cases challenging the TSA for AIT images and records
have consistently failed and, through judicial line-drawing, have
created an extremely high burden for any individual seeking to
challenge such policies.2 4 5 If a traveler is denied PreCheck status
or placed on a watch list as a result of being disqualified from
PreCheck, he or she has no practical ability under the Privacy
Act to seek his or her records because the TSA is exempt from
241 See Stanley, TSA Once Again Considering Using Commercial Data to Profile Pas-
sengers, supra note 17.
242 Sniffen, supra note 23.
243 Id.
244 Privacy Program, FDIC, www.fdic.gov/about/privacy/requirements.html
(last visited June 4, 2013).
245 See, e.g., Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 892 F. Supp.
2d 28, 50-52 (D.D.C. 2012).
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revealing the criteria relied on to assess that traveler.4 6 Specifi-
cally, an individual traveler will not be able to prove that there is
a record kept about them because the TSA does not have to
reveal that information.2 4 7
If the Privacy Act were enforced by courts in challenging such
search techniques, perhaps privacy advocates and the general
public would be more open to a risk-based system because it
would be more transparent. More simply, if courts exercised a
more balanced approach to reviewing exemptions claimed by
agencies and allowing individuals to more easily bring claims
against the agencies, then privacy advocates would feel safer
trusting the agencies to reasonably assess risk because they
would know that there will be some transparency to the process.
Considering the immense resistance intelligence agencies would
likely launch at such a proposal, this seems like an unlikely
route.
VI. CONCLUSION
As Senator Feingold predicted one month after 9/11, citizens
have become driven by fear of terror to the extent that impor-
tant personal liberties can easily be overlooked. With a proper
perspective of PreCheck and the laws under which it would be
scrutinized, it is easy to see that the TSA will likely be able to
implement almost any measures it feels necessary to ensure safe
air travel. However, the single most effective factor in curbing
potential privacy issues in the past was the public's reactions to
such proposals.5 o Specifically, CAPPS II was stopped before it
ever started due to public resistance and government officials'
reactions to such resistance.5 1
It is significant that although the ATS employs more invasive
and private techniques than CAPPS II ever proposed 2 5 2 and op-
erated in secret for years before complying with the Privacy Act,
246 See Sternstein, supra note 200.
247 See Sniffen, supra note 23.
248 See Immigration Report, supra note 197, at 1003.
249 Eric W. Dolan, Feingold: Voting Against the Patriot Act 'One of the Best Things
I've Done', THE RAw STORY (Feb. 22, 2012, 10:12 PM), http://www.rawstory.com/
rs/2012/02/22/feingold-voting-against-the-patriot-act-one-of-the-best-things-ive-
done/.
250 See Fiske, supra note 39, at 183-84.
251 Id.
252 See Privacy Act of 1974; System of Records, 71 Fed. Reg. 64,543 (Nov. 2,
2006) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 1507).
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the ATS is still in use.2 53 Perhaps the difference in public reac-
tion can be described by the disparity between the number of
international and domestic travelers. Lower numbers of affected
people would inevitably result in less resistance. However, the
main reason is likely attributed to the much broader powers
granted to CBP. Individuals know from an early age, whether
from personal experience, the news, or CIA-themed movies, that
crossing a national border immediately warrants the provision of
identification to state officials. But until 9/11, it was not the do-
mestic practice to extensively search individuals who fly
commercially.
Is the public ready for a discussion about risk-based security?
Perhaps. If the public is still afraid and outraged at the idea of
commercial databases and secret risk scores, it will likely resist
this concept. But what about desensitization to these issues?
How many Americans simply accept that nothing they do is pri-
vate anymore due to exposure to social media and targeted in-
ternet advertisements? Could the span of eight years really dull
the outrage the traveling public felt toward CAPPS II? Desensiti-
zation will surely occur as more people opt to join PreCheck and
other kilown traveler programs. This result is inevitable due to
the way that the TSA has framed PreCheck: a voluntary, conve-
nient, minimally invasive, "positive" profiling program that will
help passengers save time and prevent aggravation. This shift
from negative to positive profiling has helped the popularity of
risk-based security tremendously. Meanwhile, many of the im-
pressed individuals will be unwittingly handing the TSA their
waiver to perform exactly the type of search that appalled them
under CAPPS II.
Many travelers have and will continue to trade information
for relief from the inefficiencies of today's security processes.
The questions that members of the public really need to ask
themselves are (1) how much they understand about the pro-
cess; (2) what value they place on the potential privacy implica-
tions of these measures; and (3) what benefits they believe will
result, whether it be efficiency or security. Ultimately, political
responses to such measures will be the only practical means of
scaling back such policies in light of the courts' failure to do so.
253 See PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 32, at 9.
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